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New empirical evidence with regards to the effectiveness and efficiency of Chile’s capital controls
is provided here, based on more and better data on the range of controls and a broad assessment of
their costs and benefits. The paper concludes that capital controls have been partially effective by
raising the wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates, reducing aggregate net capital
inflows, and changing the debt composition toward longer maturities, without significantly altering
the real exchange rate. Part of these effects is temporary as the effectiveness of controls is eroded
over time for a given interest rates differential. Controls may have been crucial by contributing to
Chile’s lower exposure to short-term foreign liabilities at the time of the 1997-98 international
financial turmoil. However, achieving temporary macroeconomic benefits by relying on capital
controls involves incurring in financial and growth effects that raise concerns about their
efficiency. The costs that resulted from the policy mix that comprised the capital controls, in terms
of quasi-fiscal losses and lower investment and growth, were probably not negligible.
Resumen
Este trabajo presenta nueva evidencia empírica sobre la efectividad y eficiencia de los controles de
capital en Chile. La evidencia se basa en más y mejores datos sobre estos controles y en una
estimación aproximada de algunos de sus costos y beneficios potenciales. En el trabajo se concluye
que los controles de capital han sido parcialmente efectivos en aumentar la diferencia entre las
tasas de interés internas y externas, reducir los flujos netos de capitales, y cambiar la madurez de
los pasivos externos, aunque sin afectar significativamente al tipo de cambio real. El efecto sobre la
madurez de los pasivos externos (hacia plazos más largos) pudo haber jugado un rol trascendente
durante la crisis financiera internacional de 1997-98. Sin embargo, parte de estos efectos son
transitorios debido a que la efectividad de los controles se erosiona a través del tiempo por la
existencia de diferenciales positivos de  tasas de interés. Los controles de capitales, no obstante
generar beneficios macroeconómicos transitorios, también producen efectos financieros y sobre el
crecimiento, los que deben ser tomados en cuenta para evaluar su eficiencia. Existen costos
importantes, en términos de déficits cuasi-fiscales y menores tasas de inversión y crecimiento,
resultantes de la combinación de políticas de las cuales el encaje es parte integrante.
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1.  Introduction
Controls on international capital flows have no place in a world without policy distortions
and market failures. However, even in the presence of policy distortions and market failures, it is
difficult to argue for imposing second-best measures such as capital controls. Here the conventional
argument applies that a better alternative to capital controls is to address directly the distortions
that render capital flows ‘excessive’. These distortions comprise inadequate regulation and
supervision of the financial and corporate sectors, policy-induced moral hazard created, for
instance, by the provision of foreign-exchange insurance, etc. However, one may argue that
international distortions affecting the supply of capital –ranging from the existence of contagion
and bandwagon effects in private markets, to moral hazard problems derived from the existence of
international rescuers of last resort– are not removable by recipient countries. Therefore, the
argument follows, international distortions in the supply of capital should be offset by imposing
domestic capital controls aimed at limiting excessive capital inflows in good times, hence reducing
the likelihood of a solo or a twin crisis in bad times.
Chile’s long experience with capital controls—of both the administrative and the
quantitative sort—has caught the interest of both policy makers and academics in a world of highly
volatile capital flows, especially since Mexico’s crisis in 1994-95. An increasing number of recent
studies has provided an empirical evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of Chile’s quantitative
restriction on capital inflows—the unremunerated reserve requirement imposed by the Central
Bank of Chile on selective (mostly short-term or financial) capital inflows during 1991-1998. This
paper extends this literature in three directions: first, it provides an alternative measure of the
financial cost of the reserve requirement, that differs significantly in both magnitude and effects
from conventional measures used in previous research; second, it broadens the study of capital
controls to include other administrative controls on capital flows and their effects; and third, it
evaluates various potential “social” costs of capital controls (more precisely, of the policy mix that
accompanied the controls).
Section 2 provides a brief review of existing empirical studies on Chile. Subsequently, both
quantitative and administrative controls on capital flows in Chile are described and measured.
Section 4 presents a simple dynamic model to analyze the effects of capital controls on
macroeconomic and financial aggregates. Regression results for the macroeconomic and financial
effects of all categories of capital controls are reported for monthly data covering the 1989-1998
decade in section 5. A discussion of the quasi-fiscal, financial, and growth costs of capital controls
takes place in section 6. The paper concludes with a brief summary of benefits and costs of Chile’s
capital controls presented in section 7.
2. Previous Findings and Remaining Questions
The experience of Chile since controls to capital inflows were imposed in the early 1990s,
in the form of an unremunerated reserve requirement –URR–, has been studied in a number of
papers. This section sets the stage by summarizing this literature and its main findings, and listing
some of the questions that have not been answered and, therefore, should be addressed in future
research. A more detailed review of the literature is provided in Annex 1.
Starting with the study by Soto and Valdés (1996), the growing literature on the Chilean
experience with capital controls during the 1990s has addressed three related questions, namely:2
1. Has the URR increased the effectiveness of monetary policy, in an environment where the
exchange rate is semi-fixed (i.e., where it fluctuates within a narrow band set by the authority)?
2. Has the URR allowed for a lower real exchange rate—a more depreciated currency—than it
would have been the case otherwise?
3. Has the URR contributed to a sounder—less risky—inflow composition, in the sense of
inducing inflows of longer maturity?
These questions arise directly from the reasons argued by the authority to impose and
maintain the URR in place from June 1991 through September 1998
1.
The existing research on this subject has addressed these questions using two
complementary approaches, namely:
A. Single equation models (SEMs) in which the domestic interest rate (id), the real exchange rate
(RER), and the composition of flows are regressed against the URR and other explanatory
variables, and
B. Vector auto-regressive (VAR) models.
The SEMs are aimed at identifying and measuring the direct effect of the URR—
controlling for other determinants—on any of the three dependent variables (id, RER, and the
composition of flows). One disadvantage of this approach is that it requires strong assumptions
regarding the functional form of the equations to be estimated (i.e., the relationship among the
different variables) and exogeneity of the right hand side variables. Furthermore, there is a risk of
an estimation bias because of missing variables. The VAR approach, on the other hand, addresses
these problems since it identifies the dynamic relationship existing among the variables, imposing
only minimum identification restrictions. However, it does not provide a direct measure of the
effect of the URR on the variables of interest, nor does it identify the channel through which the
URR works.
Using quarterly data for 1987-96 and the SEM approach, Soto and Valdés (1996) and
Valdés and Soto (1998) conclude that the imposition of the URR did not alter the appreciating
trend observed in the real exchange rate during the 1990s. However, these authors conclude that the
URR changed the composition of inflows, reducing the share of taxed flows in total short-term
credit. This effect was stronger (albeit marginally significant) during 1995-96, when the URR was
higher, and when a non-linear single equation model is used in the estimations. Also using a SEM
approach but monthly data for 1991-96, Eyzaguirre and Schmidt-Hebbel (1997) reach a similar
conclusion regarding the composition of inflows; in particular, they find that the URR reduces the
share of short-term flows and increases that of long-term flows. Also, the latter find that the URR
increases the effectiveness of monetary policy—the URR permits a higher interest rate differential
with foreign rates—and depreciates the real exchange rate, albeit on a temporary basis. However,
their findings show that the latter two effects are rather weak and not robust to different
specifications for the estimated equations.
Conversely, using quarterly data for 1985-94 and a SEM, Laurens and Cardoso (1998)
conclude that the URR had no effect on the composition of inflows, and assert that the URR did
                                                
1 The URR was not abolished, but its rate was dropped to zero in September 1998. Thus, the authority kept
the option to use the instrument in the future.3
affect neither the real exchange rate nor the interest rate differential. However, the way this model
is estimated and the sample period used cast some doubts about these conclusions
2.
The main weaknesses of the preceding studies is that the estimations do not control for
changes in other capital account regulations, namely, the liberalization of capital outflows and
inflows, and for changes in the URR other than the tax rate (i.e., coverage and presence of
loopholes)
3. The recent paper by De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (1999) addresses the latter
limitation by including a new variable aimed at measuring the presence of loopholes (an index
measuring the power of the URR). Using a SEM and quarterly data for 1987-96, they conclude that
the URR gave the monetary authority additional room to maneuver—permitted a higher domestic
interest rate—and changed the composition of inflows toward long-term flows. However, like
previous studies, they are still unable to find any significant effect on the real exchange rate (RER)
and on total inflows.
The latter result regarding the RER presents a puzzle, since the higher level of the domestic
interest rates—supported by the URR—should lead to lower domestic spending and hence to a
more depreciated real exchange rate. The reason that this effect has not been found in the empirical
papers based on the SEM approach is most likely due to mispecification problems. This is
corroborated by the results reported in the two studies that use the VAR approach, Soto (1997) and
De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (1999). Indeed, using monthly data for 1991-96 and 1991-98,
respectively, these authors find that a shock on the URR causes a transitory real exchange rate
depreciation. Furthermore, Soto (1997) finds that increases in the URR leads to a reduction in the
volatility of the RER. These papers also confirm the previous findings regarding the level of
domestic interest rates and the composition of inflows.
In sum, there is robust evidence showing that the URR has led to higher domestic interest
rates—or a larger differential with international interest rates—and a composition of inflows biased
towards longer maturities. However, the effect of the URR on the real exchange rate—or its path—
has proved to be more difficult to uncover, most likely due to the difficulties in finding the correct
model that relates these two (and other) variables. This issue requires additional research.
Additional methodological aspects remain to be addressed in future empirical research.
Among these are the need to properly control for the liberalization of capital inflows and
outflows—something we attempt to do here—, and permitting other functional forms for the
relationship between the URR and the variables of interest
4. Also, there is the need to consider the
social costs and welfare implications of the URR, something we also attempt to do—albeit
indirectly—in this paper (see section 6).
                                                
2 The capital control —or URR— index used in this regression is positively correlated with the dependent
variable (inflows) by construction, biasing its estimated coefficient upwards. In particular, the capital
control index is measured as the URR tax-rate times the tax base. The latter, in turn, is constructed as the
cumulative capital inflows since 1985. This puts the contemporaneous inflow variable on both sides of the
estimated equation. In addition, the sample period comprises years when capital inflows were not entirely
voluntary—voluntary flows to Chile resumed only in 1989.
3 For a critical review of the literature—without rigorous empirical analysis—see Nadal-De Simone and
Sorsa (1999).
4 It is plausible that the URR affects the inflow of capital—through the interest rates differential—in a non-
linear way, especially since it puts a wedge separating the decision to borrow from abroad from that of
investing abroad (the URR separates the two conditions of arbitrage). It is worth noting that none of the
empirical papers exploring this relationship allows for a non-linear specification in this regard.4
3. Capital Controls in Chile during the 1990s
Trends of Capital Controls worldwide and in Chile
While controls on inflows and outflows can be equivalent under steady-state conditions (as
argued by Laban and Larraín, 1997), they are very different under non-stationary conditions and, in
particular, in a crisis situation. Indeed, controls on inflows (like Chile’s 1991-98 reserve
requirement) are imposed ex-ante in a preventive way, while controls on outflows are typically
imposed as ex-post measures to stem capital outflows (like Chile’s 1982 and Malaysia’ 1997
controls). As a change in the rules of the game that amounts at least to a temporary expropriation,
controls on outflows are much more costly to foreign investors and to the countries that impose
them.  In addition, the international evidence suggests that controls on outflows are easier to evade
than those on inflows. Finally, controls on inflows are pro-cyclical (they are imposed when the
world supply of capital increases), while controls on outflows are anti-cyclical.
Chile is no exception to this world experience, with a long history of controls on capital
account flows and transactions that started in the 1930s and continued through the mid-1970s.
Controls were gradually liberalized in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but were tightened again in
the aftermath of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s.
The resumption of voluntary capital flows to emerging markets coincided in time with new
capital inflows starting coming to Chile in 1988. After a growing tide of inflows during 1988-1990,
the CBCh imposed new quantitative restrictions in the form of an unremunerated reserve
requirement on selective inflows in 1991 (that lasted through September 1998), and began
liberalizing old administrative controls on outflows. At the same time, however, other quantitative
and administrative controls on capital inflows were also lessened. We review the specific
restrictions and their changes observed during the last decade next (see Table 3.1 and annexes 2, 3
and 4).
The unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on selective capital inflows
The URR is a requirement to hold an unremunerated fixed-term (mostly 1-year) reserve at
the Central Bank, equivalent to a fraction of capital inflows of selective categories. Hence the URR
is equivalent to a tax per unit of time that declines with the permanence or maturity of the affected
capital inflows. The quantitative nature of this restriction, i.e. its tax equivalence, is made explicit
by its alternative form: foreign investors are alternatively entitled to pay an up-front fee determined
by the product of the relevant foreign interest rate (i*) and the fraction of capital subject to the
restriction.
Various features of the URR were altered during the June 1991–September 1998 period of
its existence at non-zero rates. As summarized in Annex 2, the CBCh introduced changes in the rate
or fraction of deposit, the coverage of capital inflow categories, the foreign currency denomination
for the reserve deposit and fee payment, the holding period, the restrictions to rollover maturing
investments, and other administrative requirements related to the URR.










where t is the fraction of deposit of the capital inflow at the CB; h is the required holding period; k
is the average maturity of the foreign investment for which the urr is calculated (equal to 6 months
in the empirical application); and i* is the equivalent foreign interest cost for a k-month operation
5.
Similar measures to the urr defined above have been used in previous empirical studies.
They can be termed “naive“ in the sense that they do not reflect the option value of reinvesting or
rolling over the capital after maturity, as calculated by Herrera and Valdés (1998). However, in
1996 the CBCh restricted the possibility of rolling over maturing investments, reducing the
relevance of this option value.
The resulting time series for urr (Fig. 3.1) reflects both changes introduced by the CBCh
(affecting t, h/k, and the applicable i*), and changing market conditions (affecting i*). Starting with
a tax rate of 20% in June 1991, t was raised to 30% in 1992 and maintained throughout June 1998,
when it was reduced to 10%, followed by a further reduction to zero in September 1998. Other
administrative changes introduced by the CBCh affected the maturity (h/k) and the relevant i*
6,
albeit the latter was also affected by changing market conditions. (See Annex 5 for a detailed
description of how urr and its components are measured in this paper.) The resulting urr series (Fig.
3.1) shows a growing trend until late 1997, largely explained by the rising share of up-front fee
payments
7. From June 1991 through September 1998, the urr averaged 4.24% per year with a
standard deviation of 2.14%. Its maximum was 7.7% in November 1997.
An indirect measure of how binding the URR was for capital inflows to Chile is provided
by the total amount collected as deposits. The latter is comprised by the actual capital stock
deposited as required reserve at the CB, and the capital stock equivalent to the up-front fee
payments made in lieu of the reserve deposit. At its peak in August 1997, the URR implied a total
amount of US$ 2,237 million equivalent to reserve deposits, comprised by US$ 825 million of
actual deposits and US$ 1,412 million of fee-equivalent deposits (Figure 3.2). This is a sizable
amount, equal to 2.9% of 1997 GDP or 30.0 % of that year’s net capital inflow. During the whole
June 1991-September 1998 period, the total equivalent reserve deposit attained an average of 2.0%
average GDP, or 40% of the average capital-account surplus.
However, as in the case of any other tax, the URR provides an incentive for tax elusion and
tax evasion.
8 Comparing actual and required total reserve deposits provides a measure of the URR
tax effectiveness or power, pow. The latter is estimated by the ratio between the flows that were
actually taxed with the URR –either by making a deposit or paying the equivalent up-front fee– and
the total amount of new flows that were potentially subject to the URR (see annex 5 for a detailed
                                                
5 For details on the applicable i* see annex 5.
6 The CBC changed from the Yen i* to the Dollar i* in November 1994. See annex 2 for details.
7 The fee-option appears to be more expensive than making the deposit with the CB, because of the spread
of 2.5% (and 4%) applied to it on top of the foreign interest rate i* (see annex 2). However, this result is in
part due to having underestimated in our calculations the true (country and other) risk premia charged by
foreign lenders, which we estimated as being nearly constant at around 1% throughout the period.
8 Le Fort and Sanhueza (1997) provide a good description of the elusion that occurred during the period
when the URR was in effect.6
discussion of this and related measures). The estimation is made with monthly flows as shown in
equation (3.2)
(3.2) pow t= (actual flows paying the URR)t / (potential taxable flows)t
where the potential taxable flows are derived after adjusting the recorded capital inflows for the re-
labeling that occurred through the different loopholes
9.
The resulting time series (figure 3.4) suggests that the URR gained effectiveness through
time, although this occurred because of the authorities constant effort to close loopholes in URR
regulations—the latter was partly achieved by increasing its coverage. For instance, in January
1992, 6 months after its introduction, the URR power index was at 0.50, mainly because of the
increasing re-labeling of several forms of capital inflows as dollar denominated deposits. Then,
when dollar denominated deposits became subject to the URR in February 1992, the power index
increased to 0.78 (though other loopholes were discovered and used by arbitrageurs). This pattern
is shown in the figures 3.3 and 3.4. In the former figure it is possible to observe that the share of
effectively affected inflows in the total increased in time up to 1995, next there is a transitory
decline in this share in 1996, and a further increase in 1997. A more formal analysis to explain the
behavior of the power of the URR is presented in section 5 below.
Combining the simple measure of the cost of the URR (urr), adjusted for changes in the
coverage of the capital base on which the URR is required (cov), and the effectiveness or power of
the tax (pow), allows to obtain a measure of the effective cost of the reserve requirement (err):
(3.3) err = urr * cov * pow
Figure 3.4 depicts the time pattern of all three variables urr, pow, and err. All of them show
a rising trend until late 1997, leading to an err with a sample average of 3.84% and a standard
deviation of 2.30%.
Administrative controls on selective capital inflows and capital outflows
During the last decade the CBCh has liberalized to a large extent administrative restrictions
on both capital inflows and outflows. This can be seen both as part of the country’s overall trend of
economic liberalization and a (temporary) substitution of quantitative restrictions on inflows (the
URR) for administrative controls.
Regarding capital inflows, the two main quantitative restrictions are minimum solvency
requirements on domestic issuers of foreign liabilities (bonds and ADRs) and size requirements on
issues of foreign liabilities by corporations and banks. The solvency requirements impose minimum
rating levels provided by risk-rating agencies to corporations that issue equity and bonds
internationally. Size requirements refer to floors regarding absolute amounts on any issue of stocks
and bonds. Both restrictions were partly liberalized during the last decade, as reflected by their
combined measure –ix_issues– depicted in Fig. 3.5.
Minimum permanence requirements before repatriation of capital and profits may be
interpreted as restrictions on both capital inflows and outflows. Technically they affect outflows of
capital because they are imposed on capital that has flown in at some point in time–they restrict the
                                                
9 See annex 5 for more details on the construction of the relabeled flows.7
repatriation of principal and cumulative profits accrued on past investments. However, in an ex-
ante sense they will deter additional foreign investment, hence negatively affecting future capital
inflows (Labán and Larraín, 1997).
Permanence requirements on foreign investment—both portfolio and FDI—were reduced
from an average of 8 to 3 years in 1991, and further to 2.5 and 1.0 years in 1992 (ix_remit in Fig.
3.5). This liberalization was implemented in an ex-post way—i.e. old capital inflows could flow out
after complying with the new shorter permanence period. For this reason one may expect a larger
capital outflow in the short run—as intended by the CB—and this is the reason why we classify
this is a capital outflow restriction. At the same time, however, this outflow liberalization provides
an incentive for larger inflows, implying that the overall effect on net capital flows is ambiguous.
Other regulations on capital outflows that were liberalized during the last decade include
ceilings on foreign asset holdings by financial institutions—banks, insurance companies, and
pension funds—relative to their capital. Further restrictions on outflows that were lifted are
requirements imposed on exporters to surrender their export proceeds to the CB (these were fully
abolished in July 1995). An aggregate index for the two latter regulations and a host of other
secondary administrative controls on outflows as described in annex 4 is depicted as ix_other in
Fig. 3.5.
The specific indexes in Fig. 3.5 show significant and simultaneous progress in the
liberalization of both capital inflows and outflows largely concentrated during 1991-1995—this is
summarized by the (simple) average of the three indexes, ix_comp, in the figure. Towards late 1998
a significant number of restrictions had been either scrapped or significantly lessened. Collinearity
among the three quantitative restrictions is very high during the whole sample period as
liberalization was implemented across all categories of restrictions
10.
4.  A Simple Model of the Macro-Financial Dynamics of Capital Controls
Do capital controls affect macroeconomic aggregates and financial variables –and if they
do, are they temporary or permanent effects? How does a tax on capital account transactions affect
domestic interest rates, the real exchange rate, and capital inflows? In which direction do impact
and long-term effects go? We address these questions next with the help of a simple, reduced-form,
and qualitative open-economy model. The setup is in the tradition of the Australian two-sector
small open economy equilibrium complemented by a conventional portfolio equation that reflects
imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic assets. Goods and asset markets clear
instantaneously and forwarding-looking behavior is characterized by perfect foresight.
The government establishes an ad-valorem tax on the stock of net foreign assets (liabilities)
held (issued) by domestic residents. The tax is symmetric in the sense that it affects both capital
outflows and inflows; thus, no distinction is made here between taxes on outflows and inflows. The
tax is independent of both the type of capital inflow transaction and its maturity. The tax is
collected by the government –consolidated with the central bank– from domestic (foreign) holders
                                                
10 Pairwise correlation coefficients between the aggregate indexes for capital inflow restrictions (ix_issues),
permanence requirements (ix_remit), and other capital outflows restrictions (ix_other) are 0.85, 0.96, and
0.88 for the first and second, first and third, and second and third. The standard deviation for all three
correlation coefficients is 0.089.8
of foreign (domestic) assets, and returned to the domestic private sector in lump-sum fashion. The
exchange rate is fully flexible and the consolidated public sector does not hold any foreign assets.
Imperfect asset substitution between domestic government bonds and net foreign assets is
reflected in a standard portfolio equation.  A particular functional form of the latter, consistent with
standard Brainard-Tobin portfolio equilibrium features, can be rewritten as an international interest
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where e is the real exchange rate  (up is down and down is up, in the confusing LDC tradition
11), r
is the domestic real interest rate, r* is the foreign real interest rate, tax is the tax on foreign capital
holdings, b is outstanding domestic government debt in real domestic-currency units, k is
outstanding net foreign assets in real domestic-currency units, and r is a risk-premium function that
depends positively on domestic debt relative to foreign assets. Stocks are dated at end of period,
sub-index t denotes the time period, and a sign under a variable denotes the sign of the
corresponding partial derivative.
Net foreign asset accumulation is determined by the current account surplus, itself a
function of the determinants of the excess supply of traded goods net of foreign factor receipts (i.e.
the excess of saving over investment). Its determinants comprise standard variables such as the real
interest rate, the real exchange rate, net foreign assets, the terms of trade (tot), and government
spending (g):
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Non-traded goods equilibrium relates the equilibrium real exchange rate to non-traded
supply and demand determinants, similar to those included in the preceding equation. To take
account of the Balassa-Harrod-Samuelson effect of larger relative productivity growth in the
traded-goods sector on the real exchange rate, the relative traded/non-traded sector productivity of
labor (rlpt) is included. Solving the non-traded goods equilibrium condition as an implicit function
for the real interest rate yields:
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Substituting the real interest rate from eq. (4.3) into equations (4.1) and (4.2) yields a
system of two reduced-form difference equations for the real exchange rate and the stock of net
foreign assets:
                                                
11 In other words, an increase is a depreciation.9
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where sign dependencies in equation (4.5) assume that coefficient signs in the non-traded
equilibrium condition (4.3) dominate those in the net foreign asset accumulation equation (4.2).
Imposing stationary equilibrium conditions on equations (4.4) and (4.5) yields long-term
equilibrium values for the state variable k and the jumping variable e, and (by substituting the two
latter into equation 4.1 or 4.3) for r. Dynamic equilibrium exhibits saddle-path stability as depicted
in Fig. 4.1.
Now consider a rise in the tax on foreign asset holdings (Fig. 4.2). The tax imposes a long-
term wedge between domestic and foreign arbitrage interest rates, encouraging a portfolio shift
from domestic to foreign assets (i.e., lower foreign indebtedness). Net foreign assets are higher and
the equilibrium real exchange rate (as a result of larger net private wealth) is more appreciated in
the long-term, as reflected by the new steady-state equilibrium at point C (Fig. 4.2, higher panel)
12.
On impact the real exchange rate depreciates (point B), starting a subsequent process of real
exchange rate appreciation and net foreign asset accumulation toward point C.
The long-term interest rate will be higher than the initial rate (at point C, lower panel) if the
tax wedge effect on the domestic rate dominates the decline in country risk premium that arises
from the larger net foreign assets. This is likely if domestic and foreign assets are relatively close
substitutes—i.e., when the risk premium r is not excessively sensitive to changes in the relative
holdings of domestic and net foreign assets. On impact the real interest rate will increase by the
sum of the tax increase (positive) and the real exchange rate depreciation (which is negative). If the
positive tax effect dominates, the interest rate could rise on impact (to points B or B’, lower panel).
In the (unlikely) opposite case, the interest rate could fall (point B’’) on impact.
This simple framework suggests that a tax on foreign asset holdings can have very different
impact and long-term effects. While it contributes to a short-term real exchange rate depreciation,
in the long-term the tax may appreciate the real exchange rate as a result of lower net foreign
indebtedness. The current account (capital account) exhibits a temporary surplus (deficit). Real
interest rates are raised in the short-term by the direct effect of the tax, but lowered by the
temporary real exchange rate expected appreciation. The long-term domestic interest rate is likely
to be higher after the tax under conditions of empirically reasonable (high) asset substitutability.
                                                
12 Note that this simple framework abstracts from further wealth effects that could arise from an endogenous
response of domestic real capital to a permanently higher interest rate by implicitly assuming an
endowment economy. In addition the possible inconsistency between permanent changes in the difference
between the domestic interest rate and the subjective discount rate is not addressed here. Taking account of
the latter would require developing a micro-founded small open economy model, which is beyond the
scope of this paper.10
5. Empirical Results for Chile
This section reports estimation results for two sets of variables. First we specify and
estimate equations to explain the measures of quantitative and administrative capital controls. Their
specifications attempt to reflect the motivation of the Central Bank of Chile in setting the URR tax
and the average level of administrative controls. Next we specify the effect of capital controls on
the relevant macroeconomic and financial variables, following the model spelled in section 4.
We start by analyzing empirically the behavior of Chile’s capital controls and their power,
to turn next to their effect on the relevant macro and financial variables.
Sample period, data, and estimation strategy.  We fully exploit the 1989-1998:II sample period
during which Chile had relatively unhindered access to voluntary foreign capital inflows, and the
1998:7-1999:6 period when voluntary flows to emerging market economies became more scarce.
During this decade, Chile liberalized gradually its administrative restrictions on both capital
inflows and outflows and, from June 1991 through September 1998, imposed the URR discussed in
section 3. We use monthly data for all regressions, implying a maximum sample of 126
observations. Data definitions and sources are discussed in Annex 6.
Specification of equations encompasses the simple equations of the model discussed above.
Here we extend the specification by including variables that reflect non-instantaneous market
clearing in goods and asset markets—a relevant feature of high-frequency data like ours.
Estimation is by individual equations. The estimation strategy addresses potential econometric
problems derived from spurious correlation, endogeneity of right-hand side regressors, and
inefficient estimation due to residual heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, by conducting
appropriate diagnostic tests and using appropriate estimation techniques.
Diagnostic Tests.  The order of integration of individual variables varies between 0 to 1. A
significant number of variables are I(1) justifying estimation in first differences. When appropriate,
cointegration tests were conducted with generally acceptable results
13.
5.1 Capital controls
We start by studying the effectiveness of the URR. For this purpose we estimate an equation for
pow against those variables that would induce arbitrageurs to by-pass the reserve requirement, plus
the different policies implemented to reduce the evasion or elusion. The results are presented in
Table 5.1
As expected, URR effectiveness rises with changes in its coverage and other regulations
aimed at reducing its elusion and evasion. This is shown by the positive and significant coefficients
reported for the different dummies in Table 5.1, which correspond to regulatory changes affecting
dollar denominated deposits (D922), the currency denomination of the required deposit at the CB
(D941), the issue of secondary ADRs (D957), and requirements to classify inflows as FDI (D9610).
All these changes had permanent effects on the effectiveness of the URR.
More importantly, the results also show that the effectiveness of the URR decreased with
the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates (adjusted by country risk), and with the
level of the tax rate, t (a Laffer-like effect for the reserve requirement, tax). These results have
statistical significance and economic importance. For instance, for an interest rate differential of
                                                
13 Unit root and co-integration test results are available upon request.11
4.5% –equal to the sample period average–, by the time t was dropped to zero in September of
1998, the URR would have lost –ceteris paribus– about 72 percent of its initial power. This result
shows that the URR cannot be used to sustain an interest rate differential on a permanent basis.
According to the discussion in section 3, the urr was imposed in 1991 in order to retain control
of monetary policy (for achieving the inflation target), to reduce external vulnerability (by
stemming the growing tide of capital inflows, particularly of the short-term or financial types), and
to maintain external competitiveness (by reducing the deviation of the real exchange rate from its
long-term equilibrium level). Further changes in urr and its coverage were imposed by the Central
Bank to stem the loss of power due to evasion and elusion by private market participants.
Based on our measures for the urr and the effective cost of the reserve requirement (err)
reported in section 3, we now proceed to estimate equations for each of them. They are based on a
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where (p - pt) is the difference between actual and target inflation, e is the real exchange rate,
(w)kf is total net capital inflows (to all developing countries), kfl is long-term net capital inflows, y
is real domestic output,  pow is our measure of power of the reserve requirement, r* is the external
interest rate, and r is the country risk premium. The specification is restricted to include only
simple lags or polynomial distributed lags (PDLs) of right-hand side variables, reflecting that only
past variables are taken into account by the CB when setting the current (monthly) URR level.
Expected coefficient signs are positive for the inflation differential, the ratio of total net capital
inflows to GDP, the contemporaneous external interest rate adjusted by country risk, and the total
inflows to developing countries, and negative for the ratio of long-term net capital inflows to
output, the real exchange rate depreciation, the lag of external interest rate adjusted by country risk
and the power index—pow enters as a regressor only in the equation for the urr since by definition
it is part of err.
The results in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 confirm the relevance of equation (5.1) to explain the
CBCh’s use of the URR. In both measures for the cost of the URR (urr and err), all variables have
the expected signs and most of them are statistically significant at conventional levels. The CBCh
raised the URR in response to larger capital inflows but lowered it in response to higher long-term
inflows—the implication is that the Central Bank responded quite strongly and significantly to an
increase in short-term inflows. In addition, the URR was altered in response to changing conditions
in world capital markets—it was raised with the overall availability of funds and reduced with the12
(past) cost of funding (r*+r)-1 
14. Also, the URR was raised in response to a higher rate of exchange
rate appreciation, reflecting the CB concern with deterioration in foreign competitiveness. (In one
of the equations in table 5.3, we also find—with a marginally significant coefficient—that the CB
raised the URR in response to a larger actual-target inflation differential, reflecting its concern with
price stability.)
It is also interesting to note that urr falls with its own power (Table 5.2). Thus, the CBCh
raised the extent of the URR in response to a loss in power or efficiency due to evasion/elusion of
the reserve requirement.
In the 1990s, the Central Bank started lifting administrative controls on both capital inflows
and outflows. Because of the strong observed correlation of controls on inflows and outflows noted
in section 3, we construct an aggregate index of administrative controls on the capital account
(ix_comp). An increase in the index means a more restrictive regime—i.e., a less open capital
account. Next, we explore the reasons that the authorities may have had to liberalize capital inflows
and outflows. The estimated model is depicted in equation (5.2).
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The expected coefficients are negative for total net capital inflows (as a ratio of GDP) and
positive for the rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate. These expected signs imply that in
the short run the authorities expected a greater liberalization would lead to lower net inflows, thus
reducing the risks of overheating. For err the expected coefficient is positive (negative) if the
administrative controls on capital flows and the URR were used as substitutes (complements) for
the purpose of reducing overheating. The trend is expected to be negative as Chile lessened its
capital account regulations.
The results in Table 5.4 confirm expected coefficient signs at conventional significance
levels for all variables other than the depreciation of the real exchange rate. The results show that
liberalization increased through time following a worldwide trend, though at a decreasing path.
Also, as expected, capital account liberalization increased with the pace of net capital inflows and
with the loss of effectiveness of the URR, validating the notion that both instruments (the URR and
the administrative controls on capital flows) were aimed at the same goal.
5.2  Macroeconomic and Financial Variables
Domestic real interest rates.  The specification for interest rates assumes imperfect international
interest arbitrage, so that both external arbitrage and domestic market conditions affect interest
rates in the short run. The general specification that nests an equation for the Central Bank policy
rate and for the banking deposit rate is the following:
                                                
14 Note that the positive coefficients for the contemporaneous cost of funding (r*+r)t in tables 5.2 and 5.3 do
not have a meaningful interpretation; i.e., (r*+r)t is included in the regressions to control for the fact that it
is part of urrt.13
(5.3)
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The first four regressors represent cost-equivalent components of international arbitrage
conditions: the real international interest rate (r*), the expected real exchange rate depreciation (ê
e),
the URR policy (err), and a measure of the country risk premium (r). We also include the index of
administrative controls on capital outflows (ix_outflows)
15 to check for a possible effect from the
increasing financial integration. The ratio of the outstanding stock of net external liabilities (l) to
output is also included, to reflect a combination of the positive country-risk effect and the negative
effect on the domestic credit demand due to lower private financial wealth. An additional domestic
private credit demand determinant is captured by the foreign terms of trade (tot). Policy variables
include the ratios of aggregate government spending (g) and real M1 (m) to output. As three main
arguments of the monetary policy reaction function we also include the difference between actual
and target inflation, the ratio of actual to full-employment output, and the current account surplus.
These were the main concern of the CB throughout the sample period.
Expected coefficient signs are positive for the first four components of the international
arbitrage condition, government spending, the actual-target inflation difference, and the business-
cycle effect. However, expected coefficients are negative for money, the current account surplus,
and the index of administrative controls on capital outflows. The expected sign is ambiguous for
the GDP ratio of net external liabilities and for the terms of trade—in the latter case depends on
whether shocks are permanent or transitory.
Two variants of equation (5.3) are implemented: one for cbr, the Central Bank policy real
rate of interest
16 and the other for rdep, the 91-365 day banking-sector real deposit rate. The central
bank rate is expected to have a strong effect on the deposit rate (but not the reverse). Both rates are
highly correlated but the central bank shows lower variation
17. In the spirit of a monetary policy
reaction function, we estimate the equation for cbr controlling for imperfect interest rate arbitrage,
as a function of standard monetary policy objectives. The cbr is specified as depending only on
lagged variables or polynomials as the Central Bank makes decisions based on information with a
lag of 1 month or more. The second variant, for rdep, is in the spirit of an imperfect international
arbitrage model a la Edwards-Khan (1985), where both foreign arbitrage and domestic credit
demand variables determine this rate. We have added to the latter the Central Bank policy rate.
Potential regressors include both contemporaneous and lagged variables.
The results in Table 5.5 for the CB policy rate show that all policy function determinants
(p, y and cas) explain significantly the Bank’s policy stance, implying that the CB raises its policy
rate whenever the economy shows signs of overheating. Regarding the foreign interest arbitrage
condition, none of its determinants appear to be significant (possibly due to the use of high
frequency data). More interesting are the results regarding the URR policy. No significant effect is
                                                
15 This is a combined measure of ix_remit and ix_other.
16 On 90-day maturity instruments until 1995; overnight rate afterwards.
17 For monthly observations from 1989.1 through 1999.6 the following results are obtained. The
contemporaneous correlation between both variables is 0.86, with a standard deviation of 0.089. The
standard deviation of each variable separately is 0.0122 for cbr and 0.0178 for rdep.14
found for any of the measures of the financial cost of the URR (urr, err) or some combination of
them and the determinants of the interest arbitrage condition. However, when analyzing the
different elements comprising the URR policy it appears that its power matters for setting the
policy rate; i.e., the role of the URR policy in permitting higher domestic interest rates was due
primarily to its power rather than the rate (tax). On average during 1991-98, the URR efficiency (or
power) –kept at about 0.8 by some combination of increasing coverage and cracking down on
evasion/elusion– permitted a rise in the Bank’s policy rate of about 9 basis points.
As argued above, for the banking deposit rate (rdep) we include the imperfect interest
arbitrage components, the CB policy rate cbr, and potential credit demand determinants. The
results in Table 5.6 show that all components of the foreign interest arbitrage variable, including
the different elements of the URR, do not attain conventional significance levels. It is not
surprising that their role in determining the deposit rate is completely dominated by the CB policy
rate. Thus, the market has fully internalized the fact that the CB uses its policy rate to control
aggregate demand and contain overheating pressures.
The fiscal policy stance, the domestic economic cycle, and the liberalization of capital
outflows all exert a strong positive effect on the banking deposit rate. A higher stock of net foreign
liabilities and improving terms of trade both reduce the deposit rate, suggesting that the wealth
effect dominates the risk effect and transitory effects dominate permanent effects in the former and
latter case, respectively.
Real exchange rate. The equation estimated for the real exchange rate differs from the simple
specification of the model presented above in several respects. In particular, we solve equation 4.4
for the contemporaneous level of the real exchange rate –implying that most coefficients change
sign– and include other variables that influence the equilibrium in non-traded goods (like the phase
of the cycle). In addition, we consider temporary effects of asset-market pressures –captured by the
domestic-foreign interest rate differential– and nominal exchange rate pressures. The broader
equation that we estimate is the following:
(5.4) 
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The first 6 regressors reflect the short and long-term influence on the real exchange rate of
changes in non-traded goods market conditions. However, they also include the GDP ratio of net
foreign liabilities (l) and the domestic interest rate (r) since both have a role on long-term
investment-saving decisions and on temporary portfolio shifts that influence net capital inflows.
The four following regressors reflect the temporary influence of asset market pressures arising
from the components of foreign interest rate arbitrage. The final variable reflects the temporary
influence of a nominal devaluation –E is the nominal exchange rate level consistent with the
definition of e– while D stands for the difference operator.
Expected coefficient signs are positive for the GDP ratio of net foreign liabilities, the
components of the foreign interest arbitrage expression, and the lagged nominal exchange rate
depreciation, while expected coefficients are negative for the relative traded/non-traded sector15
labor productivity, government spending, the business cycle, the terms of trade, and the domestic
interest rate
18.
We proceed in two steps. First, a co-integration relationship was found among a small
number of I(1) variables that are potentially linked by a long-term relationship (bottom of Table
5.7). The co-integration vector for the log of the real exchange rate is comprised of the GDP ratio
of government spending, the GDP ratio of net foreign liabilities, the relative traded/non-traded
labor productivity, and the terms of trade, and displays significant expected signs for all but the last
variable. Next, we include the lagged residual from the cointegration relationship in a standard
error-correction model that considers as regressors many other short-term determinants of the
exchange rate devaluation (top of Table 5.7)
19. Among the determinants of the non-traded goods
market equilibrium are selective lags of the business cycle and the traded/non-traded sector labor
productivity. However, neither the domestic interest rate nor the components of the foreign interest
arbitrage condition –except for the country risk premium (r)– affect the real exchange rate. Thus,
as previous research has shown, neither measure of the cost of the URR –urr, nor err–exerted a
statistically significant influence on the real exchange rate.
Total net capital inflows. As in the case of the preceding equation, the specification for net capital
inflows reflects both the permanent influence of the determinants of the goods-markets equilibrium
(i.e., the current account), and the temporary influence of asset-market pressures (captured by the




































  _ _                    






1 , 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
1
1
l l l l r l l
l l l l l l l l l
+ + + + + +

















The first 6 regressors reflect the influence of the determinants of the current account deficit
on capital inflows. They are identical to the long-term fundamentals of the real exchange rate in
equation (5.5), except for the exclusion of the traded/non-traded labor productivity (rlpt) and the
inclusion of the real exchange rate (e). The latter variable is expected to reduce the current account
deficit, hence, net capital inflows.
The domestic interest rate (r) has a double role: it influences long-term investment-saving
decisions and affects temporary portfolio shifts that influence net capital inflows. We assume that
the latter effect dominates. The five following regressors reflect the influence of the foreign interest
rate parity. Among them is the ratio of short-term to total outstanding net foreign liabilities (ks/k)
that should increase the country risk premium. Furthermore, we include both the indexes of
administrative controls on remittances of past investment and profits, and of new international
issues (with expected coefficients of different sign), and a measure of the relative world supply of
capital flows to developing countries, wfk/wy, to capture international push factors.
                                                
18 We assume that the negative effect through portfolio shifts (i.e., the interest rate arbitrage condition)
dominates the positive effect through investment- saving decisions (i.e., the expenditure channel).
19 We have also included a term for the rate of depreciation between periods 5 and 6 as expected at period t-
1, to make the actual 1-month devaluation horizon consistent with the six-month maturity of all relevant
interest rates included in the regression.16
Expected coefficient signs are positive for the GDP ratio of government spending, the
business cycle variable, the index of administrative controls on remittances, the domestic interest
rate, and the relative supply of foreign capital to developing countries. Expected coefficients are
negative for the terms of trade, the ratio of short-term to total net foreign liabilities, the level of the
real exchange rate, the index of administrative controls on international issues, the components of
the foreign interest rate parity condition including the country risk (r) and the URR, and the GDP
ratio of net foreign liabilities.
The overall results in table 5.8 are mixed. The two measures of the cost of the URR, urr
and err, have the correct sign, but only the latter is statistically significant. This implies that the
URR is effective in reducing the flow of foreign capital but only to the extent that its power is not
eroded. Thus, increasing the err in 100 basis points per year –through some combination of
increasing its coverage and cracking down evasion/elusion– reduces total inflows by about 1
percent of GDP, and affected inflows by about 2 percent of GDP, implying a substitution of not-
affected for affected flows. However, the results regarding other regressors are less satisfactory.
Only the determinants of country risk –net foreign liabilities over GDP and the share of short-term
debt in the total– and the index of administrative controls on new international issues show the
correct sign and attain statistical significance at conventional levels. On the contrary, all the
determinants of the current account and the interest rate differential show the wrong sign (and some
of these coefficients are statistically significant). This leads us to believe that a more serious bias
problem may be present in the results reported in table 5.8.
To check the robustness of these results we run the same regressions but using the current
account deficit as a regressior instead of its determinants. The results, reported in Table 5.9, show
that all the coefficients have the correct sign, and except for the index of administrative controls on
new international issues, all attain statistical significance at standard levels. Most important, again
the effective cost of the URR (err) appears to play a marginally significant –albeit small– negative
role in total net capital inflows. Thus, the result that increasing the err in 100 basis points reduces
net capital inflows by about one percentage point of GDP in the short-term still holds. This is again
a temporary effect as the power of the URR (and hence err itself) declines over time for a given
interest rates differential. However, the result regarding the substitution between non-affected and
affected flows does not appear so clearly as before. We address this issue using a different
approach next.
Composition of total net foreign liabilities. As a substitute for the preceding result about the
composition of net capital inflows, we test for the effect of capital controls on the composition of
outstanding total net foreign liability stocks, controlling for other return and risk variables that may
affect portfolio composition. We specify the following equation for the ratio of short-term to
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The portfolio share of short-term debt in total net foreign liabilities is expected to rise with
the domestic to foreign interest rate differential (because the latter attracts short-term flows).
Similarly, a more restrictive environment for the remittance of past investments and accrued profits
should lead (in the short run) to a decrease in the share of short-term debt (ls) in total liabilities (l).
Country risk –or its determinants– will affect negatively both short-term and long-term foreign
inward investment. Hence, expected coefficient signs are positive for the domestic interest rate,17
ambiguous for total net foreign indebtedness, and negative for the index of administrative controls
on remittances, the foreign interest rate, the expected rate of depreciation, the effective cost of the
URR, and the marginal product of capital. Only lagged values or PDLs enter the specification.
Results in table 5.10 are relatively disappointing, however, as a few variables do not exhibit
expected signs or acceptable significance levels. This result notwithstanding, both measures of the
cost of the URR unambiguously reduce the share of short-term debt in net foreign liabilities. Also,
as expected, lessening the conditions for the remittance of foreign capital led to a larger share of
short-term foreign liabilities in the total.
Conclusions. We have gone a long way in testing for the macroeconomic and financial effects of
Chile’s capital controls. We derive various conclusions from our empirical estimations.
Capital controls themselves have been highly responsive to the domestic and international
macro-financial environment. The Central Bank of Chile put the URR into place for a combination
of reasons: to retain monetary control, to stem overall capital inflows and, in particular, short-term
and financial inflows, and to maintain international competitiveness. Our results confirm these
motives. Both the simple measure (urr) and the effective measure (err) of the cost of the Chilean
URR increased with total capital inflows, the level of short-term flows, and the level of exchange
rate appreciation (and err also responded to the difference between actual and target inflation
levels). In addition the CB responded to the decline in tax power due to evasion and elusion by
raising the cost and coverage of the URR through various changes in its administration. Separately
we have also obtained results for the intensity of administrative controls on capital outflows: they
tend to respond to similar variables as the URR and, in addition, seem to have been used as a
complement to the latter.
A monetary policy function, complemented by imperfect foreign interest arbitrage, was
estimated for the CBCh’s policy rate. Controlling for the significant influence of policy objectives,
the power of the URR has had a significant positive effect on the CBCh’s policy rate –but we did
not find any direct effect of the cost measures urr and err. Subsequently we focused on the real
bank deposit rate, finding the CBCh’s rate to be a main determinant. No separate direct effects
were found for either err or urr. Hence err has exerted only an indirect, albeit significant, influence
on the bank deposit rate. This stands in contrast to controls on outflows: lowering the latter
throughout the 1990s has helped in raising the bank deposit rate.
An error-correction model for the real exchange rate that reflects temporary and permanent
influences of both short and long-run non-traded goods market equilibrium determinants and
temporary asset-market equilibrium forces did not yield significant effects of Chile’s capital
controls. This may be due to the offsetting short and medium-term effects of larger capital controls
on the real exchange rate, as suggested by the model sketched in section 4.
A similar model –reflecting the influence of short and long-term effects of variables
affecting investment-saving decisions and temporary effects due to domestic-foreign interest rate
differentials– was specified and run for net capital inflows. Total net inflows were reduced
significantly by the err (but not by the alternative urr). Moreover, there is some evidence (albeit
weak) that the err reduced proportionately more some type of flows, implying some kind of
substitution between tax-exempt flows and short-term and URR-affected flows.
An alternative portfolio composition equation for the share of short-term in total net foreign
liability stocks shows a significant negative effect of both urr or err. Hence the Chilean URR has18
unambiguously changed the composition of total net foreign liability flows and stocks away from
short-term (or affected) and toward medium and long-term (or not affected).
6. Potential costs of the URR
The existing research has focused on the macroeconomic aspects of the URR and its
effects, neglecting all microeconomic considerations. However, there are strong reasons to address
microeconomic and welfare implications of the URR. Indeed, the finding reported above
concerning the URR’s positive (direct and indirect) effect on the level of domestic interest rates,
suggests that some costs may have been paid in Chile since 1991, due to the reallocation of
resources induced by the higher prevailing interest. Among these are the use of resources in the
search for loopholes and, associated to it, the cost of uncovering and closing these loopholes
(incurred by private investors and the authorities, respectively). In this section we discuss the most
important costs derived from the URR and the policy mix that accompanied it, and to the extent
allowed by the data, attempt to quantify them.
6.1 Non-measurable costs
Market segmentation. The most obvious cost arises from the fact that the URR discriminates
among investors with different access to capital markets, and between investment projects with
different expected productive lives. Since information asymmetries play a crucial role in financial
markets, and there are fix costs—i.e., economies of scale—of overcoming them, usually small
borrowers have limited access to capital markets and, like short-term investors, must rely largely on
bank lending to fund their operations. To the extent that it is more difficult for the banking system
to elude the URR, either because it is closely monitored by the authorities or due to the nature of its
business, small investors (and projects with a shorter life) will bear a proportionately larger cost of
the URR. Thus, it is expected that the URR will represent a larger tax for small and medium size
enterprises, deterring their growth and giving a competitive advantage to larger enterprises with
direct access to international capital markets.
Also, the existence of the URR, especially if it is in place for a long period, may exacerbate
the process of financial desintermediation. This will occur since companies with access to long-
term funding through the issue of primary ADRs (and long-term bonds) will have an additional
incentive not to finance their investments through the banking system. This will also occur in the
medium-term, as the search for loopholes in URR regulations will lead to the development of new
(and less efficient) forms of financing (i.e., through direct credit from foreign suppliers). In sum,
the URR will, at the margin, exacerbate the asymmetries existing in financial markets between
small and large businesses, while artificially discriminating against short-term projects (those that
are more heavily taxed) and promoting the development of less efficient ways of financing.
Search for loopholes. To the extent that the URR creates profitable arbitrage opportunities, a result
that depends on the monetary policy stance followed after imposing the URR, businessmen will
allocate resources to the search of loopholes in URR regulations. The resources spent in these
search activities, as well as those spent by the authorities in detecting and closing loopholes, are a
clear deadweight for the society as a whole. These search losses are dependent on the URR leading
to higher domestic interest rates, something that has been convincingly proved in this and previous
research as occurring in Chile. Moreover, the microeconomic distortions referred above will be
more acute if because of the URR, short-term interest rates increase proportionately more than
long-term rates, a likely result considering the nature of the Chilean URR.19
Indirect evidence. It is important to note that the extent of these distortions and their associated
costs are proportional to the interest rate differential with abroad, itself a result of the monetary
policy applied after imposing the URR. In the case of Chile the CB increased short-term interest
rates to dampen aggregate demand and avoid overheating several times before and after imposing
the URR—in fact the URR was introduced in an attempt to increase the effectiveness of a tight
monetary policy. An indirect manner to assess the extent of the distortion introduced with the URR
is by looking at changes in the slope of the term-structure.
Figure 6.1 shows the differential between long- and short-term CB interest rates through
the late 1980s and 1990s, and highlights (gray areas) the periods when the CBCh tightened
monetary policy in order to dampen aggregate demand. During the periods when the CB’s policy
rate was relatively high, the short-term rate was higher than the long-term rate—i.e., the term-
structure was negatively sloped. A similar conclusion follows when looking at the term-structure of
interest rates constructed from the yields observed in the secondary market; i.e., the term-structure
was negatively sloped several times during the 1980s and 1990s (figure 6.2)
20.
It is important to note that the term structure had a negative slope—indicative of the degree
of microeconomic distortion—at times when the monetary policy was tightened, but not necessarily
when the URR was raised. This is clearly seen in figure 6.1 that shows a normal (positively sloped)
term-structure during 1992, the year when the URR rate was increased from 20 to 30 percent. This
finding is confirmed by regressing the difference between long- and short-term interest rates
against the URR and the CB’s policy rate. Table 6.1 shows that the CB’s monetary policy rate
reduced the slope of the term structure, whereas the URR had no significant effect on it.
Thus, the URR affected the level of domestic interest rates—especially short-term rates—
and lead to resource misallocation only indirectly through the tight monetary policy applied by the
authority. This is consistent with the findings in section 5—and in previous research
21—regarding
the different coefficients found for the URR and the CB’s rate in the regression that explains
market deposit rates (see table 5.6).
6.2 Measurable costs
Given the result above, it can be argued more generally that the potential costs are not due
to the URR per se, but to the macroeconomic policy stance that accompanied and was supported by
it, namely, a tighter monetary policy, a more expansionary fiscal policy, and a less flexible
exchange rate policy than otherwise. This policy-mix proved to be costly to the extent that it led to
higher domestic interest rates and the CB holding a larger stock of international reserves. In what
follows we attempt to measure the costs associated with these outcomes.
A simple look at the data shows that during the 1990’s relatively high interest rates
prevailed. For instance, Loayza and Gallego (1999) compare the US T-bill 3-month rate with the
                                                
20 The rates used in figures 6.1 and 6.2 are not comparable because the former are risk-free rates from CB
securities (at the time of issue), while the latter are an average of the yields in corporate bonds, mortgages
and CB securities takem from the secondary market.
21 De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés (1999) report that the URR is more important than foreign rates (i*) in
explaining the level of domestic interest (i
d) rates, though in their model the two variables enter the
estimated equation linearly and could be added. They explain this finding by arguing that the URR acts
indirectly by permitting the authority to raise domestic rates.20
rate in the CBCh 3-month notes during 1991:6 and 1997:12. They conclude that the average
interest rate differential was about 4.62 percent per year. Of this, about 0.68 percent can be
explained by the sum of country risk, foreign exchange risk, and exchange rate depreciation
22,
while about 3.94 percent can be explained by the authorities’ attempt to dampen aggregate demand
by maintaining a tight monetary policy.
23
Lower investment and growth. In addition to the misallocation of resources discussed above, the
economy as a whole paid a cost derived from the lower investment and growth that resulted from
the higher interest rates prevailing during the period. To assess this effect we proceed as follows:
first we construct an estimate for the interest rate that would have prevailed without the URR.
Next, relying on previous research on the determinants of aggregate investment and the stock of
capital in Chile, we estimate the rate of investment and growth that would have existed without the
URR. Though the exercise is done for each year during 1991-97, the discussion that follows refers
to the average for the entire period.
Using actual data on foreign interest rates, foreign inflation, and the country risk
premium
24, and assuming that the real exchange rate was expected to appreciate by 2 percent per
year
25, we estimated a proxy for the real interest rate that would have prevailed in Chile during
1991-97. The resulting series, however, underestimated the rate that would have prevailed because
of the foreign exchange (and possibly other) risk premium. We solved this by taking the difference
between the resulting series and the actual deposit rates that prevailed in Chile during the 8 months
immediately preceding the introduction of the URR. As this difference largely exceeds any
plausible estimate of the exchange rate risk premium—mainly because the period prior to
introducing the URR was one of monetary tightness—we interpret it as a measure of the
‘unexplained interest differential’ (UID) that comprises the effect of both, the tight monetary policy
applied and the FX risk premium. Based on these estimates we took four possible measures
26 for
the UID, and proceeded to estimate the interest rate differentials for subsequent years that were
caused and/or supported by the URR
27. The results are reported in table 6.2 at the end. The
estimates show that the increase in interest due or induced by the URR is in the range of 2 to 3
                                                
22 Note that during this period the real exchange rate steadily appreciated.
23 Of this amount about 3.0 percent can be attributed directly to the URR, while 0.94 percent to other capital
inflow taxes (Herrera and Valdés, 1997). Regarding the latter figure, there is a stamp-tax of 0.1 percent per
month, with a ceiling of 1.2 percent (or twelve months), on all domestic credits. This was extended to
foreign credits in mid 1990 (see annex 2).
24 For the foreign interest rate we used the dollar 180-days LIBOR, for foreign inflation we took the 6-month
(forward) change in the US WPI, and for country risk premium we used the average of the actual spreads
charged in bond issues by Chilean firms each year.
25 This rate corresponds to the (long-term) slope of the nominal exchange rate band announced by the
authorities—the middle-point of this band moved by the difference between domestic and foreign inflation,
minus an adjustment of 2 percent equal to the relative gain in productivity in the Chilean tradable sector. It
is important to note that the assumption regarding the level of this rate is irrelevant for our purposes, since
any measurement error in it carries on into the estimate for the UID.
26 This difference fluctuated widely between October 1990 and May 1991, because in the months prior to the
introduction of the URR the Central Bank tightened (and then relaxed) monetary policy. In all calculations
the domestic rate is the deposit real rate for similar maturities.
27 Since the base period—last quarter of 1990 through first half of 1991—was one of tight monetary policy
(see figure 6.1), most likely the effect on interest rates attributed to the monetary policy stance will be
overestimated for subsequent years. Hence, the effect on interest rates attributed to the URR and
accompanying policies will tend to be biased downwards.21
percent per year. These figures are fully consistent with those given in previous research based on a
different approach
28.
Next, we use these interest differentials to estimate the effect on aggregate investment and
economic growth. Based on the findings of Bustos et al. (1998), we estimate the capital-output ratio
that would have existed in the absence of the URR
29. Similarly, we also used the results reported by
Lehmann (1991) to compute the new levels of aggregate investment that would have taken place if
the interest rates had been lower
30. Using these results and an Incremental Capital Output Ratio of
4.0—equal to the actual mean ICOR observed in Chile during 1991-97—we computed the cost in
terms of lower growth
31. The results are presented in table 6.3 at the end.
Overall, in the absence of the URR and the accompanying policy mix the Chilean economy
would have grown by about half of a percentage point per year more than it actually did. The
compound lost in output growth during the whole 1991-97 period fluctuates between 3.2 and 5.8
percent, depending on which results are used for the calculations
32. Finally, the model estimated by
Lehmann (1991) permits the computation of a social cost á la Harberger—that is, the deadweight
measured as the area under the demand for investment. Measured in terms of the average GDP
during 1991-97, this cost was about 1.56 percent per year (a cumulative cost of about 11 percent of
GDP for the entire period).
Quasi fiscal losses. The tight monetary policy applied to dampen aggregate demand, jointly with
the attempt to avoid a sharp appreciation of the real (and nominal) exchange rate, led to a large and
rapid accumulation of international reserves at the CB through the 1990s. Thus, the stock of
international reserves increased from US$ 2.5 billion (six months of imports) in 1988, to US$ 17.8
billion (11 months of imports) in 1997. Figure 6.3 shows the monthly percentage changes in the
stock of international reserves and domestic credit from March 1989, through June 1998. It is clear
that the monetary authority attempted through the decade to sterilize the increases in the monetary
base caused by the surge in inflows (itself partly induced by the high interest rates).
Holding this stock of reserves—and financing it by the issue of domestic debt—imposed an
important burden on the Central Bank’s budget. However, the cost that could be attributed to the
policy-mix chosen by the authority refers only to the stock of reserves held in excess by the Central
Bank. This potential cost is equal to the reserves held in excess—in turn, the difference between
the actual and the optimum level of reserves—times the difference in returns on domestic debt and
that on foreign assets. To assess this cost we constructed two measures of the optimum level of
reserves, each based on a different assumption. The first measure assumes that there is an optimum
ratio between reserves and monthly imports, while the second assumes an optimum ratio between
international reserves and domestic credit, the other component of the monetary base. We estimated
these two equilibrium ratios using the average figures of monthly imports, international reserves,
                                                
28 The estimates given in the literature are based on the URR formula presented in equation 3.1 for different
investment maturities.
29 Using data for 1980-95, Bustos et al. (1998) estimate a model for the long-term capital-output ratio for the
Chilean economy. Among the determinants in their model is the real interest rate.
30 Using Chilean data for 1981-89, Lehmann (1991) estimates a model for the level of total productive
investment.
31 In the case of the model by Bustos et al. we also assumed that the investment rate changes in the same
proportion than the capital-output ratio. This seems a reasonable assumption given that their model is valid
for the long-term.
32 These results are consistent with lower investment rates—as a share of GDP—of about 1.23 and 3.2
percent per year, respectively.22
and domestic credit for 1985-88. Figure 6.4 shows the actual level of reserves, and the reserves
held in excess during 1990-98 (measured as a share of the actual stock).
It is clear from figure 6.4 that the stock of reserves held by the CB through the 1990s was
significantly higher than the optimum—on average, using the optimum average of 6.9 months of
imports, about 37 percent of the stock held was excessive (52 percent if using the estimate based on
the optimum composition of monetary base). The financial cost of holding the excess reserves was
computed by taking the difference between the real interest paid on CB instruments, and LIBOR
plus the change in the nominal exchange rate and minus domestic inflation. This difference was
about 6.7 percent per year on average during 1990-98. Figure 6.5 shows the cost of holding excess
reserves measured as a share of each year GDP. The estimated cost is not negligible; using the
lowest estimate it averaged about 0.6 percent per year, and amounted to about 5.2 per cent of GDP
on a cumulative basis (the corresponding figures for the highest estimate are about 0.8 and 7.2
percent, respectively). To calculate the overall financial cost for the CB, however, we need to
subtract from this figure the proceeds received for the inflows that did not make a deposit with the
CB, but preferred to take the fee option described earlier in the paper. The latter was on average
about 0.11 percent of GDP per year during the period. Thus, the net cost for the CB represented a
flow of about 0.5 percent of GDP per year on average, still a non-negligible amount.
It is important to note that the monetary cost of holding excess reserves do not necessarily
mean a net social cost. If the agents bringing capital in are residents, then the CB losses represent
just a transfer among nationals, but if the agents doing the arbitrage are non-residents, then the CB
losses become a social cost. It is impossible to know the nationality of the counterparts of the CB
losses. Thus, the figures calculated above need to be used with caution if they are interpreted as a
social cost. Nevertheless, to the extent that these losses put in jeopardy the autonomy of the Central
Bank—which will occur in the long-term if losses are sustained because of the erosion in CB’s
equity—there is a social cost associated to them (though the latter is not easily measured).
7. Pros and Cons of the URR, conclusions and overall assessment.
In this paper we have analyzed the Chilean experience with capital controls during the
1990s, extending the existing literature on the subject in three dimensions. First, we broadened the
concept of the URR to take into account changes in its effectiveness through time; second, we
constructed indicators for other administrative measures aimed at liberalizing the capital account;
third, we attempted to estimate the economic costs associated to the URR in terms of growth and
quasi-fiscal losses; finally, we extended the sample period to include the last year when the URR
rate was reduced to zero.
From our analysis of the Chilean experience we briefly summarize and conclude next on
the pros and cons of capital controls. Since our findings are based on a single country experience,
our final remarks will refer to the potential risks associated with using the same type of capital
controls in other countries.
Potential benefits of the URR
(i) Monetary independence. The URR can be beneficial for a country like Chile because it permits
a greater degree of monetary autonomy. Since it introduces a wedge between domestic and foreign
interest rates, the URR provides more space for the use of monetary policy to accommodate
different shocks. Our results show that this benefit was achieved in the case of Chile. However, we23
also found that the interest rate differential supported by the URR –more precisely by its power–
was, on average, relatively small (9 basis points).
(ii) Real Exchange Rate. The URR should lead –in the short run– to a less appreciated real
exchange rate and, therefore, a more competitive export sector. However, our results do not support
this view. The Chilean experience shows that the introduction of the URR did not affect the real
exchange rate.
(iii) External indebtedness. The URR is expected to lead to smaller capital inflows, therefore
reducing the country’s overall indebtedness. Our results validate this view for the case of Chile. We
find that the URR led to a fall in capital inflows, although this effect is of a transitory nature due to
the URR loss of power.
(iv) Composition of inflows. The URR is expected to change the composition of capital inflows
toward longer maturities, making the recipient country more resilient to shocks. Our results
indirectly show that this result was attained in the case of Chile. The introduction of the URR led to
a distribution of external liabilities that was skewed towards long-term stocks.
Overall, through channels (iii) and (iv) above the URR allowed the Chilean economy to
attain better economic fundamentals than otherwise. This very likely reduced the risk of suffering a
sudden reversal of flows—and eventually a recession and financial crisis—when external
conditions changed in 1997-98, even if the reversal of flows could have been caused by pure
contagion or bandwagon effects. This benefit should not be overlooked despite the difficulties
associated with measuring it (something that we do not attempt in this paper). It should be
emphasized that the negative effects on short, medium and long-term growth of an episode of
capital flight and a disruption in the access to international capital markets, may be quite
substantial. The latter was shown by the experience of Latin America after the debt crisis of the
early 1980s.
However, when trying to draw the relevant policy lessons it should be kept in mind that
these benefits are of a temporary nature, and can be realized only if the central bank is very active
in maintaining the effectiveness of the URR. The speed at which the URR loses its effectiveness
indicates that economic fundamentals will start deteriorating shortly after the URR has been
introduced if the central bank fails in doing its job.24
Potential costs of the URR
(i) Quasi-fiscal losses. The URR can lead to large quasi-fiscal losses, mainly because it loses its
effectiveness through time and, for a given interest rate differential sought by the authorities, may
induce a rapid accumulation of reserves. The Chilean experience shows that the net cost associated
with funding the excess of reserves is not negligible, reaching about 0.5 percent of GDP per year.
(ii) Misallocation of resources. Since the URR tends to increase short-term interest rates
proportionately more, or because banks are more tightly monitored, it will lead to an inefficient
allocation of resources. In particular, the URR will discriminate against short-term projects and
those sectors that are more dependent on bank financing. In addition, there are costs associated to
the search for loopholes and their closure. Although this cost could not be measured in the case of
Chile, it is likely that its burden has fallen proportionately more on the small and medium size
enterprises.
(iii) Investment and growth. The higher level of domestic interest rate caused by the URR reduces
investment and long-term growth. This cost is dependent on the interest elasticity of investment. In
the case of Chile this cost is non-negligible. Our results show that without the URR  –and the
policy stance that accompanied it– the Chilean economy could have grown by about half of a
percentage point more than it did during the 1990s.
Some final remarks
Before closing it is important to keep in mind that the effectiveness of the URR in the case
of Chile is due, to a large extent, to the high enforcement capacity of the CB, the long tradition of
compliance with the law, and a relatively low degree of corruption. Thus, in countries operating
with a weaker institutional and legal environment, a reserve requirement of the sort used by Chile
could be less effective and, in the extreme, lead to more corruption.
Similarly, the URR used in Chile has to be understood as a complementary policy aimed at
improving the trade-off between monetary and exchange rate policies. However, it is not aimed at
substituting for a sound fiscal stance or an appropriate regulatory and prudential framework for the
financial system. It is possible that in many instances the URR could be wrongly used as an excuse
to delay the implementation of important reforms in the financial system or the fiscal front. This
has not been the case in Chile as the country has a solid, highly capitalized and well-regulated
financial sector, and has maintained a largely sound fiscal stance since the mid-1980s.
Despite of the difficulties in assessing its net benefits or costs, the URR should be
understood as part of a policy mix where the exchange rate was allowed to move within pre-
specified bounds. However, in the long run adequate regulation of banks and corporations and
avoidance of government guarantees that lead to excessive foreign indebtedness could replace
capital controls, in particular within a context of a floating exchange rate system.25
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Annex 1 Empirical Studies: summary of results and methodologies used
Study by S. Valdés & M. Soto
(1998)
Comments Laurens & Cardoso
(1998)
Comments C. Soto (1997) Comments











Theoretical model Yes; partial
equilibrium, single
equation
Use back of the
envelope (simple)
formula;
URR enters in a non-





URR enters in a non-
linear way in the
estimation




Controls for Variables included
are:
 - sterilization YES Change in CB’s NFA
as share of GDP
NO - Domestic interest
rate
 - scale flow variable C.A balance for LAC
countries
As a share of Chile’s
GDP
NO - Capital control
index
 - capital outflow
liberalization
NO NO - RER
 - trade volume
(credit)
YES NO - RER volatility
 - country risk rating Use S&P rating Take values 1 when
invest. grade and 0
otherwise
NO - Capital flows, level
and composition
 - domestic interest
rate set by the CB
YES This is endogenous






Dependent variable Short-term credit








All of the above
Hypothesis tested URR on ST flows Whether flowsii
(and on the RER in
previous paper)
respond to the URR
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for re-labeling










no formal test is
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since a drop in short-
term flows reverses
after a few quarters
(but a chart shows a
decrease in the share
of short-term flows
in the total)









variable on it: it is
calculated as flows
times the tax rate.





in a small amount




- the nominal (and
real) exchange rate
(depreciates)
- and real exchange
rate volatility (lower)




Study by De Gregorio, Edwards and
Valdés (1999)
Comments Eyzaguirre & Schmidt-Hebbel
(1997)
Comments
Frequency, period Quarterly 1987-96 and
Monthly 1991-98
Monthly, 1991-1996
Theoretical model Yes, for  the derivation of the
URR formula
In the empirical part use a simple back of the
envelope calculation; also a power index
aimed at capturing the lack (or presence) of
loopholes is used;
YES; portfolio equilibrium (macro)
model
Empirical model one equation models in all cases
plus VARs, linear effect
URR enters linearly in all the equations one equation model in all cases;
URR enters the equations linearly
Treats URR as an
endogenous variable
(estimates an equation for
this purpose)
Controls for
 - sterilization NO Does it indirectly by putting the CB
set rate as an explanatory variable
in the interest rate equation
 - scale flow variable yes, but resulted being non-
significant
NO
 - capital outflow
liberalization
NO NO
 - trade volume
(credit)
- country risk rating YES (relative to other countries) NO
- domestic interest
rate set by the CB
(used as a dependent variable in
the interest rate equation)
Control for the determinants of the CB policy
(domestic inflation) instead
YES (see above)
Dependent variable Interest rates; total and short
term-flows; real exchange rate
Short-term interest rate; flow
composition; RER and URR (also
DNFA)
Hypothesis tested URR on interest rates, flows
(composition), and the RER
Main Pitfalls Endogeneity issue Use Ivs
Main argument The URR gives the authority
some room to meneuver;
substitution between capital
flows occursiv
Conclusion The URR—using i* in dollars—
does permit higher domestic
interest rates and skew capital
inflows toward long-term flows
on a permanent basis; however,
the RER is not affected by the
imposition of  URR
In the VAR estimations they find that the
RER depreciates, on a transitory basis, with
the increase in the URR; bottom line: there is
no conclusive evidence on the effect on the
RER
The URR has increased interest
rates (though the results are not
very robust), and through this
channel it has reduced the CAD
(though these results are rather
weak). Similarly, the URR would
have a small and transitory effect
on the RER (though the results are
not very robust)
The URR has a strong effect on the
composition of inflows
The URR responded (D
+)
to movements in the RER
(appreciation)v
Annex 2 URR: changes in coverage, rates, and methodology
Date Event Comments
mid-1990 Stamp tax of 1.2% (max.) extended to all foreign credits
June 15, 1991 20 percent URR was introduced to new foreign borrowing
RR is in the same currency than the credit
Apply to foreign loans to banks and non-banks
except direct trade credit, with the restriction
that shipment must occur within six months.
Holding period was equal to the loan maturity
with a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of
one year
June 27, 1991 URR can be exchanged for a paid up front fee, equal to the
financial cost of the URR (using LIBOR for the calculation)
URR is extended to all credits whose disbursement occurs
abroad and those that will be used abroad
URR is also extended to those credits that are linked to FDI
projects
As these flows were exempt from the URR, this
closes a loophole
January 23, 1992 URR extended to foreign exchange denominated term deposits
held at commercial banks by domestic and foreign residents
Closes a loophole
May 28 1992 URR is increased to 30 percent, except for direct borrowing
by firms which remains at 20% Holding period was set at one
year for all flows
Cost increased proportionately more for banks
than for non-bank  borrowers
August 19, 1992 URR is set uniformly at 30 percent
Paid-up front fee calculated at LIBOR + 2.5%
October 30 1992 Paid-up front fee increased to LIBOR + 4%
October 1993 Shipment of merchandise using trade credit (exempt from
URR) must occur within 300 days
This enlarges the loophole of using trade credit
to bypass the URR
November 1994 Up front fee becomes payable only in dollars
July 4, 1995 Secondary ADRs become subject to the URR, since these are
not longer considered as FDI.
Other inward financial—non-FDI and non- primary ADRs—
become subject to the URR.
Closes a loophole. (Note: since primary ADRs
were considered capital additions, they were
never subject to the URR.)vi
September 14,
1995
Period to purchase foreign exchange after selling ADRs in the
domestic market is shortened to 5 days
Prior to this date, there was not a regulation
forcing foreigners to take their capital out of the
country after selling their stock holdings
December 1995 New foreign borrowing to prepay other loans is exempted
from URR, when the new loan is of equal or shorter maturity
than the remaining maturity of the (old) loan to be repaid
June 1996 Foreign credits cannot be rolled over more than once within a
year
Closes a loophole
October 23, 1996 FDI classifies as such—and is exempt from URR—only if it
increases productive capacity
The FDI committee is in charge of determining




Foreign borrowing for up to US$ 200,000 (or US$ 0.5 MM
per year) is exempted from URR
March 1997 Minimum amount for exemption of the URR is reduced to
US$ 100,000  in 12 months
April 18, 1997 The remittance of funds—principal and profits—from
investments by Chileans abroad is exempt from URR.
September 22,
1997
The proceeds from closing positions in derivatives (options) in
foreign markets becomes exempt from the URR
June 1998 URR was reduced to 10 percent, except for credit lines and
foreign currency denominated deposits
August 1998 URR was eliminated for secondary ADRs. This had the objective of recovering liquidity for
ADRs, and reversing the declining volume of
transactions in the local stock market.
September 16,
1998
URR was reduced to 0 percentvii
Annex 3 Other measures aimed at liberalizing capital inflows
Date Event Comments
May 1992 Minimum solvency required to all financial and non-financial
corporations aiming to issue bonds internationally (minimum solvency
of A or higher)
The investment grade is given by the
national risk classification commission
(refers to a domestic rating)
October 1992 International issue of convertible bonds is authorized
June 1993 The requirement for the issue of bonds was modified in the sense that
rating from an international agency was required
Rating had to be equal or higher than
sovereign risk
April 1994 Non-financial corporations have to be classified at least as BBB+ in
order to issue bonds internationally; for banks the classification must be
BBB or higher (prior classification was A for both)
The minimum issue size is set at US$ 25 MM (reduced from US$50
MM) for non-banks; it stays at US$50 MM for banks
September 1994 Financial corporations had to be classified at least as BBB+ to issue
stock internationally; for debt the classification must be A/B or higher
(BBB+ for subordinated debt)
September 1994 Requirements for ADR issues are reduced from A to BBB+ and from a
minimum of US$ 50 MM to US$ 25 MM (for first issues)
November 1995 For firms issuing ADRs for a second time the minimum size is set at
US$ 10 MM  (from US$ 25 MM)
Prior to this date there was no rule
referring to second issues (the same as
first issues applied)
September, 1996 Requirements for minimum size of internationally issued bonds of non-
financial corporations are reduced to US$ 10 MM.
April, 1998 Requirements for minimum size of internationally issued bonds of non-
financial corporations are reduced to US$ 5 MM. The minimum
classification was reduced to BBB-
June, 1999 Minimum maturaty requirements on  internationally issued bonds of
non-financial corporations are eliminated. The minimum rating for both
bonds and ADR issues was lessened. Requirements of previous
authorization for international bond issues are eliminated for both
financial and (some) non-financial corporations
Prior to this date the minimum maturity
was 4 yearsviii
Annex 4 Capital outflow liberalization
Date Event Comments
February 1991 - Commercial banks were permitted to increase external trade financing and use
up to 25 per cent of FX time deposits for foreign trade financing
- Joint-venture rules were simplified
- Procedures for direct investment abroad by corporates was simplified
April 1991 Waiting period for capital remittances for inward investment under debt-equity
swap mechanism (chapter XIX) was shortened from 10 to 3 years
The waiting period could be reduced
after paying a fee proportional to the
discount at which the debt instruments
used in the swap operation had been
bought in the international market.
April 1991 Banks can invest abroad up to 40% of the funds collected as term deposits
denominated in FX
April 1991 Outward FDI by Chileans financed with foreign exchange acquired in the
informal market is authorized.
The period to surrender capital and profits from this investment abroad is
extended from 3 to 4 months.
The only requirement for investors is
to inform the CB about the transaction
March 1992 - Limit on net foreign exchange holdings by commercial banks was doubled;
- Exports receipts exempt from surrender requirements were increased from 15%
to 50%
- Allocations of foreign exchange for a variety of payments abroad were
increased
- Period of advance purchase of foreign exchange for debt service was extended
May 1992 Pension funds were allowed to invest up to 1.5% abroad. Investment grade assets only (BBB or
higher)
May 1992 It was established that between May 1992 and April 1993, the cumulative profits
up to December 1992 of all foreign investments taken under chapter XIX (debt-
equity swaps) could be repatriated.
Part of it could be repatriated until
April 1993, and the rest within 270
days after that date.
August 1992 It was established that the capital of chapter XIX investments could be
repatriated after paying a fee equal to 3% of the capital.
August 1992 Pension funds were allowed to invest up to 3% of their portfolio abroad.ix
March 1993 The restriction on profit remittances for debt-equity swap investments—those
under chapter XIX—was reduced from 5 years to 1 year after investment had
taken place
Applies to all investment undertaken
before June 30, 1990 (only two
chapter XIX operations were
authorized in 1991 and before the
program was discontinued)
April 1993 The restriction on capital repatriation for foreign investors other than those using
debt-equity swaps (i.e., those under DL600 and chapter XIV) was reduced from 3
years to 1 year
There were no restrictions on profit
repatriation for these foreign
investments (only for chapter XIX)
September 1994 Banks are authorized to invest up to 20% of their capital in financial institutions
abroad.
November 1994 Limits for some institutional investors to invest abroad are raised as follows:
- insurance companies: 10% of their portfolio
- mutual funds: 30% of the portfolio
Investment grade instruments only
(BBB or higher)
January 1995 Pension funds were allowed to invest up to 6% of their portfolios abroad. Investment grade instruments only
(BBB or higher)
May 1995 The CB authorizes pension funds to invest abroad up to 9% of their portfolios;
half of this can be in equity
July 1995 Exports receipts exempt from surrender requirements were increased from 50%
to 100%
August 1995 Chapter XIX was eliminated; hence, restrictions on capital and profit remittances
are unified under the general rule of 1 and zero years for capital and profits,
respectively
Note: FICEs (country funds) were
always subject to a 5-year minimum
stay period for capital (and zero for
profits)
December 1996 The CB authorizes pension funds to invest in International Investment funds
April 1997 The CB authorizes pension funds to invest abroad up to 12% of their portfolios.
Investment abroad financed with foreign exchange acquired in formal mkt. is
extended to deposits, credits, natural resources exploration and other instruments.
The repatriation of capital and profits is not compulsory.
June 1998 The treatment of formal and informal markets is fully equalized.
January 1999 The CB authorizes pension funds to invest abroad up to 16% of their portfoliosx
Annex 5. Construction of the control variables
1
In this paper we aim to overcome some of the limitations of previous research by
controlling the empirical estimations for the changes in capital account regulations, others than the
imposition of the URR in 1991 and its modifications thereafter. In particular, we constructed
indicators of the regulations affecting capital outflows and inflows in regards with:
(i) Mandatory period of permanence and minimum number of years before the remittances of
principal and profits from foreign investment in Chile is permitted;
(ii) Solvency requirements and minimum issue size affecting Chilean corporates taping the
international capital markets through the issue of bonds and shares (ADRs);
(iii) Other regulations affecting capital outflows. These include restrictions (ceilings) affecting
foreign investment by Chilean pension funds, banks and insurance companies, surrender
requirements for Chilean exporters, and other minor regulations.
Restrictions on remittances
The first index (i) was constructed as follows. Since the repatriation requirements for the principal
(and profits) were different for those investments that occurred under the debt-equity swap
mechanisms, we took a weighted average of the years of minimum permanence that applied to each
type of flow. The weights used were the corresponding share of each type of foreign investment
(debt-equity swap versus non-debt equity swaps) in the total during 1985-1991:Q1. The resulting
index starts at 8 in 1989, drops to 3 in 1991, and continues falling to reach 1 at the end of the
sample period. In the empirical analysis we use a normalized index (Figure 3.5). The normalization
procedure consists of setting the highest value (the most restrictive stage) of each index at 1, and
the smallest value at 0 (the less restrictive stage). This methodology is the same as the one used by
BID (1997) among others.
2
Solvency and size restrictions on international issues
The second index (ii) is constructed by multiplying two sub-indices, one referring to
minimum solvency requirements and the other to minimum size issue. The latter was constructed
by taking the ratio between the size issue required at each time, and the minimum over the whole
sample period—thus, this ratio fluctuated between 1 (end of the sample period) and 10 (beginning
of the sample period). Since different types of issues (ADRs, bonds by banks, and bonds by non-
banks) have different requirements, the share of each type of issue in the total weighted the
resulting numbers during 1997-98
3. The minimum solvency requirements (AAA, BBB+, etc.) were
translated into a numerical scale by decreasing the index in 1.0 each time that the restrictions were
relaxed. The starting value (when issues were prohibited) was set equal to 10, and intermediate
values were found by fixing the end value—when restrictions were the lowest—in 1.0 and working
backwards. The resulting index starts at 100 and drops to 1.7 towards the end of the sample period
(Figure 3.4).
Restrictions on other capital outflows
                                                          
1 The information needed for constructing some of the indices described below is reported in Annexes 2, 3
and 4.
2 This procedure is also used in the next indexes.
3 We used 1997-98 to calculate the weights because did not have data on primary ADRs for previous years.xi
The third index (iii) was constructed by fixing the starting value at 11, and decreasing the
index each time that a significant change occurred. This methodology is the same than the one used
by Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997) when constructing a capital control index for the case of Brazil.
The resulting index decreases to 1.0 towards the end of the sample period.
Composed indexes of restrictions on capital flows
The fourth index (used in the empirical part of this paper) is a composed index of all the
restrictions on capital flows (inflows or outflows), and was constructed as the simple average of the
three normalized indexes mentioned above.
Power Index
Following De Gregorio et.al (1999), in this paper we included a power index aimed at
measuring the effectiveness of the URR—alternatively, the difficulties encountered when trying to
elude or bypass it. However, instead of using a qualitative index as in De Gregorio et.al (1999), we
constructed an index based on flows that paid the URR and flows that were relabeled. For this we
started by identifying the kind of flow and the period when the relabeling took place. Next, we
studied the behavior of each flow in the months before and after the relabeling occurred, and using
this information projected the relabeled flows. Finally, we constructed the power index as the ratio
between the flows that actually paid the URR and the potentially affected flows (estimated as the
sum of the flows that paid URR, the relabeled flows, and errors and omissions). The resulting
power index is shown in figure 3.3.
Coverage
The coverage index constructed in this paper, used in the regression analysis and in the
estimation of the power index, is a step function that increases from 1.0 to 1.17 in June 1995, and
falls back to 1.0 in June 1998. The increase (and drop) reflects the inclusion of secondary ADRs in
the URR, and is proportional to the share of this type of inflows in the total during 1989:1-1991:6.
Relevant foreign interest rate (i*)
The relevant foreign interest rate is a weighted average of the dollar-LIBOR (id) and the
Yen-LIBOR (iy). This is used to reflect the option that investors had to choose the currency of their
deposits at the CB. The weights are taken from the actual currency composition of reserve deposits
in each period. Also, the foreign currency rates used (id, iy) are a weighted average of LIBOR + r
and LIBOR + y, where y is the premium charged on the up front fee (see annex 2), and r is an
estimation of the country risk premium paid by Chilean corporations during the sample period.xii





Author’s Elaboration. See below for details on each component of this variable
Actual and target inflation Central Bank of Chile. The Central Bank of Chile’s target inflation is set for December of each year. So, we construct
the monthly target using the lineal combination of each couple of two consecutive targets.
Real exchange rate Central Bank of Chile.
Policy Interest Rate Central Bank of Chile. This variable is the PRBC rate up to 1995, and the overnight rate since.
Deposit Interest Rate Central Bank of Chile This rate is the one paid on 91-365 days deposits
Capital Flows to Chile Balance of Payment Department,
Central Bank of Chile.
Capital Flows to the
Emerging Markets
Author’s elaboration based on the
IMF International Finance Statistics.
We construct this variable using the quarterly capital account deficits for the OECD countries
over the GDP of OECD countries, next we interpolate the quarterly data to monthly frequency
using standard RATS routines.
Power Index Author’s elaboration. See annex 5 for more details.
Capital Account Indexes Author’s elaboration. See annex 5 for more details.
International Interest Rate Central Bank of Chile. This rate corresponds to the LIBOR-180 days.
Expected Exchange Rate
Depreciation
Author’s elaboration. This variable is constructed as the projection from rolling regressions for the 6 months exchange
rate depreciation. This methodology is the same than the one used by De Gregorio et al. (1999)
Country Risk Author’s elaboration, Central Bank
of Chile and EMBI.
This variable is the premium charged on international bond issued by Chilean corporations.
GDP Author’s elaboration and Central
Bank of Chile
This variable was constructed using the IMACEC (monthly aggregate production index) to
transform the quarterly GDP into a monthly basis.
Terms of Trade Central Bank of Chile We interpolate the quarterly data to monthly frequency using standard RATS routines.
Government Expenditure Ministry of Finance and author’s
elaboration
M1 Central Bank of Chile
Rlpt Author’s elaboration in base of data
obtained form Central Bank of Chile
and National Institute of Statistics
This variable is constructed with the same methodology used by Valdés and Délano (1999)
Nominal Exchange rate Central Bank of Chile
Output gap Author’s elaboration We estimated the potential GDP using a HP Filter.
Net Foreign Liabilities Authors’s elabotation This variable was constructed adding the monthly flows to the figures estimated by Milessi-
Ferretti (1998) for December of 1988Table 3.1   Restrictions on Capital Flows in Chile, 1989-1998
On Capital Inflows On Capital Outflows
Quantitative Restrictions Unremunerated reserve
requirement (URR) on selective
capital inflows
—
Administrative Restrictions Minimum solvency
requirements on domestic




repatriation of capital and
profits
Size requirements on issues of
foreign liabilities
Ceilings on foreign asset




































Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis.Table 5.2
Cost of the URR
Dependent  Variable: D(urr) Dependent  Variable: D(urr)
Sample 1991:06-1998:09 1991:06-1998:09












































































Durbin’s h 0.1 0.2
Estimation Technique LS LS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
PDL (X;,A,B,C) stands for a polynomial distributed lag for the X variable, where A and B are the first and last
lag, respectively, while C is the order of the polynomial. Table 5.3
Effective Cost of the URR
Dependent  Variable: D(err)
Sample 1991:06-1998:09
D(r 








































































Durbin’s h 0.48 0.37
Esmation Technique LS LS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
PDL (X;,A,B,C) stands for a polynomial distributed lag for the X variable, where A and B are the first and last
lag, respectively, while C is the order of the polynomial.Table 5.4
Administrative Controls on Capital Account


































Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
PDL (X;,A,B,C) stands for a polynomial distributed lag for the X variable, where A and B are the first and last
lag, respectively, while C is the order of the polynomial.Table 5.5














































- - - -




- - - -
D(err)+D(ext) - - - - 0.00
(0.51)
- - -
D(urr)+D(ext) - - - - - 0.00
(0.47)
- -
D(tax) - - - - - - 0.08
(1.46)
-













































































2 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Durbin’s h 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.14 0.15 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
Esmation
Technique
LS LS LS LS LS LS LS LS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
D (ext) = D ( r* )  + D(
e
t e ˆ )
PDL (X;,A,B,C) stands for a polynomial distributed lag for the X variable, where A and B are the first and last
lag, respectively, while C is the order of the polynomial.Table 5.6














































- - - -




- - - -
D(err)+D(ext) - - - - -0.01
(1.26)
- - -
D(urr)+D(ext) - - - - - -0.01
(0.98)
- -
Durr - - - - - - 0.08
(0.48)
-





















































































































































2 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35
Durbin’s h 0.34 0.54 0.33 0.49 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.18
Esmation
Technique
LS LS LS LS LS LS LS LS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
D (ext) = D ( r* )  + D(
e
t e ˆ )Table 5.7
Real Exchange Rate



























































































D(gapext)-D(err) - - -0.00
(1.28)
-
D(gapext)-D(urr) - - - -0.00
(1.20)
Adjusted R
2 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21
DW 2.00 2.01 2.00 2.00
Estimation Technique LS LS LS LS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported. D (gapext)=D (rcb) - D (r*) - D(
e
t e 6 ˆ +  )
B. Cointegration Vector























Log likelihood 1619.5 1310.8
Estimation Technique Johansen Johansen










D (rcb) - D (r*)
- D(
e



























































































































































2 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.47
DW 1.98 1.98 1.97 1.97 2.11 2.08
Estimation Technique TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
The instrumented variables are real exchange rate, the ratio of actual output to potential output. The










D (rcb) - D (r*)
- D(
e





















































































































2 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.59 0.57
DW 1.91 1.90 1.97 1.97 1.71 1.66
Estimation Technique TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
The current account surplus is instrumented using: lags  of itself, the terms of trade, the ratio of government
expenditure to GDP, and lags of exchange rate and the ratio of actual output to potential output.Table 5.10





































Estimation Technique LS LS
Newey-West consistent t-statistics in parenthesis, constants not reported.
PDL (X;,A,B,C) stands for a polynomial distributed lag for the X variable, where A and B are the
first and last lag, respectively, while C is the order of the polynomial.
Table 6.1: Regression of interest rate differentials on URR and CB’s policy rate
Dependent variable: ilong-term – ishort-term
































Adjusted R² 0.94 0.93 0.23 0.021
Durbin-Watson -- -- 1.73 1.74
Period 1988:2-1997:12 1991:1-1997:12 1988:1-1997:12 1991:1-1997:12
N 119 84 120 84
T tests are in parenthesis.Table 6.2: Interest rates differential due to the URR (1991-1997)
Interest Rate Differential (%)
Year (Unexplained differential per year)
2.67 2.50 2.00 1.50
1991 0.63 0.80 1.30 1.80
1992 2.85 3.02 3.52 4.02
1993 4.09 4.26 4.76 5.26
1994 2.28 2.45 2.95 3.45
1995 0.58 0.74 1.24 1.74
1996 2.32 2.49 2.99 3.49
1997 0.90 1.07 1.57 2.07
Average 1.95 2.12 2.62 3.12
Table 6.3: Lower economic growth due to the URR-induced interest rate differentials
Lower growth: 1991-97 average
Average interest differential Lehmann (1991) Bustos et.al. (1998)





Average 0.46 0.81Figure 3.1


































































































































Share of Effectively Affected Potentially Affected
MM of US$Figure 3.4































































































































































ix_remit ix_other ix_issues ix_comp
Figure 3.5
Administrative Controls in Capital Inflows and Capital OutflowsFigure  4.1
















D k = 0
D e = 0
Net foreign assets (k)
Net foreign assets (k)Figure  4.2
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(Left hand  side)




















































































































Tight Monetary Policy Periods comprise: 2nd. sem. of 1989, 1995; 1st. sem. of 1991 and the first three 
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Change in Int'l Reserves


























































































































Right-hand  side axis
Right-hand  side axis
Note: Excess reserves 1 refers to the estimate based on the months of imports, while excess











































Note: Cost 1 refers to the estimate based on months of imports, while cost 2 refers to the estimate
based on the optimum composition of the monetary base.